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Abstract 
Wage inequality in the U.S. grew rapidly from the early 1980s, and information and 
communication technology (ICT) has been blamed for this social problem. Although 
information technology (IT) and communication technology (CT) have different effects, 
few empirical studies consider their distinct impacts on the dynamics of inequality. We 
examine the distinct impacts of IT and CT on inequality from the knowledge hierarchy 
perspective for the period 2004-2014, using comprehensive data on wages, 
employment, and ICT capital. Our findings suggest that IT and CT deepen wage 
inequality between the production and non-production layers. However, within the 
production layer, IT acts as a decentralizing force and CT acts as a centralizing force. 
Furthermore, ICT increases the relative demand for managers in the top layer and 
decreases demand for supervisors in the middle layer, contributing to job polarization. 
Our results imply the significant role of ICT in wage inequality, distinct from other 
technologies. 
Keywords: Skill-biased technological change, Knowledge hierarchy, Wage inequality, Span of 
control, Job polarization, Automation, Sustainability 
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Introduction 
“Are we in danger of being destroyed by our own creations?” 
- <Automation, Friend or Foe?>, Macmillan (1956) 
Many researchers have discussed the negative consequences of technology. Job automation and wage 
inequality have been major topics in this discussion, at least since the Industrial Revolution in the 18th 
century. Wage inequality has grown rapidly since the early 1980s in the U.S., and most other OECD 
countries have experienced this phenomenon more recently (Autor et al. 2008; Van Reenen 2011). Since 
digital technologies have advanced tremendously in the past few decades, information and commutation 
technology (ICT) plays a critical role, not only in productivity (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996), but also in 
employment and wage structures. Frey and Osborne (2013) argue that about 47 % of total U.S. 
employment is “at risk” from computerization. 
Rapidly growing ICT could deepen wage inequality through skill-biased technological change, a 
phenomenon that seems like a “race between education and technology” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011; 
Goldin and Katz 2008). The patterns in the top 10 % income share and ICT intensity in the U.S. seem very 
similar after World War II (Figure 1). While this is not direct evidence of causality from ICT to inequality, 
it strongly suggests a possibility of causality, leading information systems researchers to begin their recent 
focus on wage inequality. This study aims to provide empirical evidence related to the relationship 
between ICT and inequality. 
 
 
Figure 1.  ICT Intensity & Top 10% Income Share in the U.S. (1946-2013)1 
 
Although most previous studies into the impact of ICT on organizations treat ICT as aggregate capital (e.g. 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Ray et al. 2009), information technology (IT) and communication 
technology (CT) have different effects on organizations (Bloom et al. 2014) and even on the wage structure. 
However, there have been few empirical studies examining the distinct impacts of IT and CT on the 
dynamics of inequality in firm organizations. This study extends previous research on the relationship 
between ICT and inequality, though it differentiates between the impact of IT and that of CT. 
Consistent with knowledge hierarchy theory, we examine the distinct impacts of IT and CT on inequality 
for the period 2004-2014 using the Occupation Employment Statistics (OES) data set provided by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and ICT capital data set provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). The working population is divided into three groups by job description: Managers, (first-
line) Supervisors, and Workers. Within the organizations, the first group is considered a non-production 
layer and the other two are classified as a production layer. 
Our findings suggest that both IT and CT increase wage inequality between the production and non-
production layers. However, within the production layer, IT acts as a decentralizing force decreasing wage 
inequality, and CT acts as a centralizing force increasing wage inequality. Interestingly, the differing 
results between ICT and R&D distinguish the effects of ICT on wage inequality from those of other 
technologies. Furthermore, ICT increases the relative employment demand for managers at the top layer, 
and decreases demand for supervisors in the middle layer, contributing to job polarization. 
                                                             
1 We use ICT capital stock data provided by the BEA, and obtain the top 10% income share data from the World Top Income 
Database (http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/). It is worth noting that Non-ICT intensity is almost constant since the 
1980s. 
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This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we differentiate between IT and CT, which 
affects firm organizations and wage structures differently. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the 
first studies to attempt to empirically examine the distinct effects of IT and CT on wage inequality. 
Second, we link the role of organizational hierarchy to understand the dynamics of inequality. Although 
many previous studies examine the impact of technology on the labor market, this study investigates the 
effects of ICT on wage inequality and relative demand for employment on more than one type of 
hierarchical layer in organizations, providing deeper understanding of the effects of ICT on different types 
of jobs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the relevant studies. In Section 3, we 
discuss the theoretical framework for an empirical analysis of the distinct impacts of IT and CT. We 
discuss the data and methods in Section 4. Section 5 provides the preliminary results of the empirical 
analyses, and their implications are discussed in Section 6 along with suggestions for future research. 
Background 
Skill-biased technological change 
“Digital technologies change rapidly, but organizations and skills aren’t keeping pace. As a result, millions 
of people are being left behind. Their incomes and jobs are being destroyed, leaving them worse off …”  
- <Race Against the Machine>, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) 
ICT investments have been substituting for other factors of production, including labor (Chwelos et al. 
2010; Dewan and Min 1997), though the main issue here is that the substitution between ICT capital and 
labor occur disproportionately by skill level. Skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is a shift in 
production technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity, and 
thus its relative demand. SBTC has maintained upward pressure on the demand for highly skilled and 
educated workers while many lower skilled jobs have disappeared and median incomes have stagnated, 
contributing to increasing inequality. The “skill bias” attribute puts technological change at the center of 
the inequality debate (Acemoglu 1998; Machin and Van Reenen 1998). Recent studies suggest that ICT 
complements skilled labor (Autor et al. 1998; Bresnahan et al. 2002; Michaels et al. 2014). Bresnahan et 
al. (2002) show how the sharp decline in IT prices leads to a cluster of changes in IT use, organizational 
practices, and product innovation, thus increasing the demand for skilled labor. According to Frey and 
Osborne (2013), about 47 % of all U.S. employment is “at risk” from computerization, and education 
attainment is negatively associated with an occupation’s probability of computerization. 
Although wage inequality rose monotonically in the 1980s, the changes in the wage distribution have 
become more complex since the early 1990s (Van Reenen 2011). The decline of the middle class has 
recently come to the forefront of the debate about inequality in the U.S. and other OECD countries (Autor 
and Dorn 2013; Autor et al. 2009). Many researchers suggest that ICT contributes to this “job 
polarization” by automating the routine tasks mainly performed by middle-skilled occupations (Acemoglu 
and Autor 2011; Autor et al. 2003; Michaels et al. 2014). ICT is likely to increase demand for non-routine 
cognitive tasks for high-skilled workers (e.g. CEOs). Since it is not yet easy to use ICT to automate non-
routine manual tasks requiring hand-eye coordination and responses to the unforeseen (e.g. hairdressers 
and janitors), ICT has largely not affected the relative demand for low-skilled workers performing non-
routine manual tasks. On the other hand, ICT substitutes for routine tasks significantly and decreases the 
demand for middle-skilled occupations, both manual (e.g. production workers) and cognitive (e.g. clerks). 
Distinct impacts of IT and CT on organization 
A large stream of studies cover the effects of ICT on organizations (Bresnahan et al. 2002; Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 2000; Brynjolfsson et al. 1994; Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Hitt 1999; Leavitt and Whisler 1958; 
Ray et al. 2009). Although most previous studies into the impact of ICT on organizations treat ICT as 
aggregate capital, IT and CT have different impacts on organizations (Bloom et al. 2014) and even on 
wage structures.  
IT such as database systems and ERPs could act as a decentralizing or empowering force, allowing agents 
to handle more problems autonomously. Drucker (1988) suggests that the rise of IT will lead to 
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information-based organizations with a flatter structure and largely composed of autonomous specialists. 
Bresnahan et al. (2002) show that computer use is positively associated with decentralized organizations.  
By contrast, CT such as networks and mobile technology could act as a centralizing force, leading to 
dependency on a few “superstars” (Rosen 1981). Gurbaxani and Whang (1991) argue that “decision 
information costs,” incurred by the communication costs and opportunity costs from delays in 
communication, increase as a decision right is moved upward in the organizational hierarchy. CT could 
reduce the decision information costs and lead to centralized management. 
These differing effects from IT and CT influence organizations and wage structures. Bloom et al. (2014) 
empirically show that IT increases worker autonomy and plant managers’ span of control, while CT 
decreases worker autonomy. However, there have been few empirical studies of the impacts of IT and CT 
on wage inequality in firm organizations. Therefore, we examine the distinct impacts of IT and CT on 
wage inequality and relative demand for employment, consistent with knowledge hierarchy theory, as we 
discuss in the next section. 
Theoretical Framework 
Model 
This study builds on “knowledge hierarchy” theory (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Garicano 2000) 
as the guiding theoretical framework for an empirical analysis of the distinct effects of IT and CT on 
inequality. The basic premise of the theory is that production requires labor and knowledge, consistent 
with knowledge-based view that posits knowledge as an essential resource for firms (Spender 1996). 
Here, we briefly outline the simplified model of  Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)2. In order to 
produce, agents should solve “problems,” such as operational and managerial decision making. If they can 
solve it, they produce; otherwise, they ask managers or supervisors for help. The possibility of offering 
help to others allows agents to organize themselves in the form of a knowledge hierarchy to use and 
communicate their knowledge efficiently. In this knowledge hierarchy, agents are specialized in 
production, constituting the lower hierarchical layer, or specialized in management, constituting the 
upper layer. Workers learn more common and easier problems to solve and managers learn “exceptions,” 
which are usually more difficult. Garicano (2000) shows that these hierarchical organizations are optimal 
assuming that agents do not know who knows the solution to the problem they cannot solve. 
To the extent that the organization is determined by the economics of information and communication, 
ICT will change the optimal structure of the organization (Bresnahan et al. 2002; Gurbaxani and Whang 
1991). Firms with a knowledge hierarchy will decide their optimal hierarchical structure in order to 
economize on the costs of acquiring knowledge and costs of communication. ICT generally affects the 
knowledge hierarchy in a way that IT can reduce the knowledge acquisition costs and CT can decrease the 
communication costs. 
Consider the problem of a firm’s profit maximization under a knowledge hierarchy. A production worker 
draws a problem whose output is normalized to 1 per unit of time. Knowledge z is normalized in [0, 1] and 
knowledge acquisition cost is proportional to the knowledge level (  ). Agents receive wages w 
depending on their knowledge level, and the wage function of knowledge is assumed to be increasing and 
convex, that is w'(z)>0 and w''(z)>03. Problems requiring knowledge z are distributed according to a 
probability density function f(z) whose cumulative distribution function is F(z). Note that F(0)=0, and 
F(1)=1 because knowledge is normalized in [0, 1]. In addition, we assume that the easier problem is, the 
more common the problem, that is f '(z)<0. 
A worker with knowledge z can solve a problem in expectation of F(z) and a fraction of 1-F(z) requests 
managers for help. Helping a problem incurs a communication cost of h units of time (0<h<1). Thus, total 
                                                             
2  Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) present a general equilibrium theory considering heterogeneous agents’ problem to 
maximize income and firm’s problem to maximize profit. However, we only consider the firm’s problem, as in Bloom et al. (2014). 
3 Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) prove that the wage function of an agent’s ability is increasing and convex. Since agents’ 
ability can be represented as an increasing function of knowledge, we can obtain an increasing and convex wage function of 
knowledge. 
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time ℎ[1 − 	
] is required to handle problems referred by the worker per unit of time. For one worker, 
the firm needs to employ managers, at least as ℎ[1 − 	
]. Since output is 1 if the problem is solved, 
firms expect to produce with the probability of the highest knowledge level. For simplicity, we consider 
two layers: higher and lower represented by subscripts H and L, respectively. Under this knowledge 
hierarchy, the firm’s profit per worker per unit of time is: 
,			 = F	z − [a
 + 	
] −  [  + 	 ] 
!"#ℎ	$ℎ$			ℎ[1 − 	
] ≤   
Without loss of generality, we normalize  = 1. For optimal production, the number in higher layer   is 
equal to the time needed. Therefore, the firm’s profit maximization problem can be written as: 
			 = 1 − [a
 +	
] − ℎ[1 − 	
][ + 	1] 
Wage inequality 
In accordance with the model, we capture the dynamics of inequality in firm organizations as two 
measures: wage inequality and span of control. Wage inequality is defined as the ratio of higher layer 
wages to lower layer wages. Since we normalize the knowledge of higher layer to 1, wage inequality 
corresponds to the inverse of the wage of the lower layer & '(	)* in the model.  
Since f '(z)<0, the second-order condition is met. Therefore, the optimal solution can be derived in a 
straightforward manner from the first-order condition. We set forth three propositions for wage 
inequality by the comparative static analysis. 
Proposition 1. If a reduction in knowledge acquisition cost for the upper layer is larger than 
for the lower layer +,-,- >
'
/01)∗3 > 14, the reduced cost of acquiring knowledge 	
 increases 
wage inequality. 
Proposition 2. If a reduction in the cost of acquiring knowledge for the lower layer is equal to 
or larger than for the upper layer &,-,- ≤ 1* , the reduced knowledge acquisition cost 	
 
decreases wage inequality. 
Proposition 3. The reduction of communication costs increases wage inequality. 
Since wage is an increasing function of knowledge, propositions 1-3 logically result from the change in the 
knowledge level &,)∗,-*. According to the theory, IT, defined as information processing technology, will 
increase wages by reducing knowledge acquisition costs and increasing workers’ knowledge levels. The 
theoretical prediction is consistent with previous studies, suggesting that workers who use computers 
(Krueger 1993) and office equipment such as calculators (DiNardo and Pischke 1997) earn more. 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the impact of IT on wage inequality is determined by the relative 
importance of IT for each layer. Proposition 3 implies that CT increases wage inequality because CT 
reduces communication costs, providing managers with cost advantages in problem solving. 
Span of control 
Span of control is defined as the ratio of lower layer employment to higher layer employment (Garicano 
and Rossi-Hansberg 2006). In the model, span of control corresponds to 
'
/['56	)]. We set forth two 
propositions for span of control by the comparative statics. 
Proposition 4. If a reduction in knowledge acquisition cost for the upper layer is larger than 
for the lower layer, the reduced cost of acquiring knowledge decreases the upper layer’s span of 
control. 
Proposition 5. If a reduction in the cost of acquiring knowledge for the lower layer is equal to 
or larger than for the upper layer, the reduced knowledge acquisition cost increases the upper 
layer’s span of control. 
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Since IT affects wage inequality and span of control in the opposite way, propositions 4 and 5 are trivial 
results from propositions 1 and 2. However, CT affects span of control ambiguously. If the communication 
cost is reduced, more questions are asked (increase in	[1 − 	
]), but each one takes less time (decrease 
in h). If solving a problem is more important than reducing communication cost, CT will reduce span of 
control, and increase it otherwise. Span of control is negatively associated with relative demand for 
employment. If subordinates acquire more knowledge, they will require help less often and managers will 
take less responsibility in solving production problems. Consequently, span of control will increase 
because of the decreased cognitive burden on managers, and relative demand for managers will decrease. 
Methods 
Data description 
We use industry-level data for the period 2004-2014 from two sources. First, we use data on wages and 
employment from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program, provided by the BLS. The OES 
program produces annual employment and mean wage estimates for over 800 occupations classified by 
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system. Since agents are specialized in production or in 
management in a knowledge hierarchy, we consider two layers: Non-production (managers) and 
Production. To further address inequality within the production layer, we divide it into workers and 
supervisors who directly supervise and coordinate workers’ activities. Thus, the knowledge hierarchy 
consists of three layers: Managers (6.5% of employment and $ 52.4 of hourly wage, on average), 
Supervisors (6.6% and $ 27.4), and Workers (86.9% and $ 16.9) (Figure 2)4. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Hierarchical Structure 
 
Second, we obtain data on the capital stock and value-added for 22 goods-producing industries5 in the U.S. 
private sector from the BEA. ICT capital stock is measured as the sum of the net stock from the 
“information processing equipment” category and “software” in the “intellectual property product” 
category. To investigate the distinct impacts of IT and CT, we measure CT capital as “communication 
equipment” in the “information processing equipment” category and we calculate IT capital by 
subtracting CT from ICT capital. IT capital includes software, computer and peripheral equipment, 
instruments, photocopy and related equipment, and office and accounting equipment. Note that we 
assume that IT and CT capital has a relatively larger impact on knowledge acquisition costs and 
communication costs, respectively. 
We also consider research and development (R&D) and Non-ICT capital to control variables that could 
potentially affect wages and employment. Machin and Van Reenen (1998) find a strong positive 
relationship between the wage share of skilled workers and technology proxied by R&D intensity in seven 
OECD countries. We use “R&D capital” in the “intellectual property product” category as a proxy of 
overall technology. In goods-producing industries, most R&D capital relates to manufacturing and 
operation. Non-ICT capital includes non-ICT equipment (e.g. industrial equipment and transportation 
equipment) and structures. We use chain-type quantity indices as deflators for capital and value-added. 
Table 1 describes the variables contained in the data set. 
                                                             
4  Managers include management occupations in a major group of 11. We define the production layer as production-related 
occupations in major groups of 41–53 (except 45–agriculture occupations), including sales, office and administrative support, 
construction/extraction, maintenance, production, and transportation occupations. 
5 Goods-producing industries consist of mining, construction, and manufacturing. Goods-producing industries have some merits to 
apply the knowledge hierarchy framework. First, knowledge hierarchies are prevalent in manufacturing industries (Garicano and 
Rossi-Hansberg 2006). Second, there are clear divisions between hierarchical layers compared to services-providing industries. We 
discuss potential limitations to generalizing our findings for the economy as a whole in the last section. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics : 22 industries in the U.S. (2004-2014) 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
(1) Value-added 124,991.0 143212.1 9,900 772,762.2 
(2) IT capital 7729.4 13833.9 414.3 75756.0 
(3) CT capital 1,504.7 1880.2 101.3 9,618.5 
(4) Non-ICT capital 167535.4 232514.0 14023.2 1256998.0 
(5) R&D capital 36234.6 82602.2 424.2 474911.3 
Note: in millions of 2009 U.S. dollars 
Empirical model 
To estimate the impacts of IT and CT, we consider the following empirical model of natural log form: 
ln	9: = α + β' ln + =>?@4,:5' + βA ln +
B>
?@4,:5' + βC ln +
DE − =B>
?@ 4,:5' + βF ln +
G&I
?@ 4,:5' +J=DIK!>GL +JLM@G 
9: denotes two dependent variables: wage inequality and span of control for each industry (i) and year 
(t). The natural log form avoids the problem of heteroscedasticity in the data set and interprets the 
coefficient as elasticity. For empirical analysis, we consider wage inequality and span of control between 
the production and non-production layers, and between supervisors and workers. Since the OES program 
estimates wages and employment in May and BEA estimates capital stock at the end of the year, we use 
lagged terms of independent variables in the empirical model. As independent variables, capital intensity 
is measured as capital per value-added (VA). In addition to capital intensities, we also include year 
dummies to control for year-specific effects common across industries (e.g. financial crisis) and industry 
dummies to control for time-invariant industry-specific effects. 
Results 
Table 2 reports the results from estimating the aggregate impact of ICT and the distinct impacts of IT and 
CT on wage inequality. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of wage inequality between the production and 
non-production layers, and columns 3 and 4 present the results between supervisors and workers, both 
included in the production layer. 
The coefficient of ICT intensity is positive and significant for non-production layer’s wages relative to 
those in the production layer, and (insignificantly) negative for supervisors’ wages relative to those of 
workers. These results are consistent with previous studies on the collapse of middle management 
(Leavitt and Whisler 1958) and job polarization (Autor et al. 2009).  
In column 2, the coefficients of IT and CT are significantly positive, suggesting that both IT and CT 
contribute to wage inequality between the production and non-production layers. As discussed above, the 
impact of IT on wage inequality depends on the relative effects of IT in reducing knowledge acquisition 
costs for each layer. The results suggest that IT is more complementary for managers than for production 
workers, consistent with previous literature (Bresnahan et al. 2002; Michaels et al. 2014). 
However, within the production layer, IT and CT have opposite effects on wage inequality between 
supervisors and workers, resulting in an insignificant aggregate impact of ICT (column 4). While CT 
increases wage inequality, as predicted by the theory, IT decreases the wage inequality between 
supervisors and workers. The results imply that IT has larger effects on workers than on supervisors. IT 
has recently enabled workers to self-organize without supervisory intervention (MacCrory et al. 2014) and 
to solve a wide range of production problems, so they require less access to their supervisors to inform 
their decisions (Bloom et al. 2014). Consequently, within the production layer, IT acts as a decentralizing 
force, and CT acts as a centralizing force. 
Interestingly, R&D intensity decreases wage inequality between the production and non-production layers, 
and within the production layer, implying that the manufacturing and operating technologies proxied by 
R&D are more complementary to production workers. The results suggest the role of R&D as an equalizer 
within organizations, and distinguish ICT from other technologies in accounting for wage inequality. 
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Table 2. Estimation Results of Wage Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 W	Non − productionW	Production  
W	Non − production
W	Production  
W	Supervisor
W	Worker  
W	Supervisor
W	Worker  
ICT intensity 0.053*** 
(4.01) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.96) 
 
IT intensity  
0.032*** 
(2.84) 
 
-0.021** 
(-2.12) 
CT intensity  
0.024** 
(2.40) 
 
0.023*** 
(2.69) 
Non-ICT 
intensity 
-0.066*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.070*** 
(-5.05) 
0.009 
(0.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
R&D intensity -0.017** 
(-2.19) 
-0.017** 
(-2.11) 
-0.012* 
(-1.68) 
-0.013* 
(-1.82) 
R-sq(adj) 98.1 98.0 89.1 89.6 
Note: N=242, t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the aggregate impact of ICT and the distinct impacts of IT and CT 
on span of control. Columns 1 and 2 report the results between the production and non-production layers, 
and columns 3 and 4 present the results between supervisors and workers. 
ICT intensity has a significantly negative impact on the non-production layer’s span of control over the 
production layer, and a significantly positive impact on supervisor’s span of control over workers. These 
results imply that ICT increases relative demand for the employment of managers in the top layer and 
decreases the relative demand for supervisors in the middle layer, contributing to job polarization. The 
result for supervisors is consistent with MacCrory et al. (2014), who demonstrate a significant reduction 
in the need for people to supervise routine work for the period 2006-2014. 
In columns 2 and 4, IT and CT have opposing impacts on span of control. As predicted in the model, the 
impacts of IT on wage inequality and span of control are the opposite. However, the model has an 
ambiguous prediction for the impact of CT, as it depends on whether reducing communication costs or 
helping to solve problems is more important. IT significantly decreases the non-production layer’s span of 
control, thereby increasing relative demand for managers. The coefficient of CT for the non-production 
layer’s span of control over the production layer is positive and significant, implying that a decrease in 
communication cost has larger effects for managers than helping to solve problems. Reasonably, 
headquarters are usually apart from plants in goods-producing industries. Therefore, the reduced 
communication cost is probably more important for managers to manage production workers. 
In the production layer, IT significantly increases the supervisor’s span of control over workers, thus 
decreasing the relative demand for them. CT contributes negatively to supervisor’s span of control over 
workers. The SOC system defines first-line supervisors as workers who spend more than 80 % of their 
time performing supervisory activities and coordinating workers’ activities. For first-line supervisors, 
solving problems may be more important than reducing communication costs, resulting in a narrow span 
of control from CT. These results for the production layer are consistent with estimates by Bloom et al. 
(2014), which find that CAD/CAM as a proxy of IT increases significantly, and intranet as a proxy of CT 
decreases plant managers’ (corresponding to first-line supervisors) span of control using plant-level 
survey data6. 
Since ICT-producing industries (NAICS 334 - computer and electronic product manufacturing) inherently 
have tremendous ICT capital, we conduct an additional analysis excluding ICT-producing industries as a 
                                                             
6 Our work differs from Bloom et al. (2014) in several ways. First, Bloom et al. (2014) focus on changes in plant manager and worker 
autonomy through IT and CT. While autonomy may be interrelated with wages, we investigate the changes in wage structures 
through IT and CT directly. Second, while Bloom et al. (2014) do not have direct measures for the corporate headquarters’ autonomy 
and span of control, we estimate these using the direct measures of wages and employment. 
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robustness check. For brevity, we do not report the results, though all coefficient estimates remain 
unchanged for wage inequality and span of control. 
Table 3. Estimation Results for Span of Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 E	ProductionE	Non − Production 
E	Production
E	Non − Production 
E	Worker
E	Supervisor 
E	Worker
E	Supervisor 
ICT intensity -0.138*** 
(-2.76) 
 
0.069** 
(2.16) 
 
IT intensity 
 
-0.213*** 
(-5.38) 
 
0.092*** 
(3.52) 
CT intensity 
 
0.107*** 
(3.06) 
 
-0.058** 
(-2.50) 
Non-ICT 
intensity 
-0.003 
(-0.07) 
-0.029 
(-0.59) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.072** 
(-2.19) 
R&D intensity 0.041 
(1.35) 
0.036 
(1.25) 
0.009 
(0.46) 
0.012 
(0.61) 
R-sq(adj) 97.9 98.1 95.8 96.0 
Note: N=242, t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Discussion and Future Research 
This study examined the distinct effects of IT and CT on inequality in terms of wages and span of control 
from the knowledge hierarchy perspective. Our findings suggest that IT and CT have deepened wage 
inequality between the production and non-production layers for the period 2004-2014 in goods-
producing industries. However, within the production layer, IT acts as a decentralizing force and CT acts 
as a centralizing force. This study offers some plausible explanations for the inconsistent effects of ICT on 
organizational architecture, including wage structures and decision authority by differentiating IT from 
CT. Furthermore, ICT has increased the relative demand for top-level managers, and decreased the 
relative demand for supervisors in middle layer decreases, contributing to job polarization. 
This study offers two main contributions to the literature. First, we differentiated between IT and CT, 
which affect organizations and wage structures differently. To the best of our knowledge, this study is one 
of the first attempts to empirically examine the distinct effects of IT and CT on the dynamics of inequality. 
Second, we examined the role of organization to understand the dynamics of inequality. Previous studies 
focus on the impact of technology on the labor market, but not organization-level mechanism, with a few 
exceptions (e.g. Bresnahan et al. 2002; Caroli and Van Reenen 2001). This study investigated the effects 
of ICT on wage inequality and relative demand for employment on more than one type of hierarchical 
layer, providing deeper understanding of the effects of ICT on different types of jobs. 
Our study has some limitations to be addressed in future. First, although we examined the different 
effects of ICT in different layers in the organizational hierarchy, the effect of ICT would differ within the 
same layer. For instance, ICT would increase the wage inequality between “star” CEOs and “average Joe” 
managers in the same non-production layer. Investigating this issue will provide more implications for 
understanding the dynamics of inequality. Second, we included only goods-producing industries in the 
analysis. One should be careful about generalizing our findings for the economy as a whole because 
services-providing industries may be organized differently from goods-producing industries. Future 
studies should extend our empirical findings to the economy as a whole, including services-providing 
industries. Finally, although we have emphasized the importance of technology, especially ICT and R&D, 
there may be alternative explanations for skill upgrading and wage structures. For example, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1997) argue that the most important institutional changes – the decline in the real minimum 
wage, the decline in unionization rate, and economic deregulation – have significant effects on the rise in 
inequality. These explanations may complement the mechanism that we address in this study. 
 The Impact of ICT on Dynamics of Inequality 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 10 
References 
Acemoglu, D. 1998. “Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and 
Wage Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (113:4), pp. 1055–1089. 
Acemoglu, D., and Autor, D. 2011. “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and 
Earnings,” Handbook of Labor Economics (4:PART B), pp. 1043–1171. 
Autor, D. H., and Dorn, D. 2013. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US 
Labor Market,” American Economic Review (103:5), pp. 1553–1597. 
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. S. 2008. “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the 
Revisionists,” Review of Economics and Statistics (90:2), pp. 300–323. 
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. S. 2009. “The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market,” American 
Economic Review (96:2), pp. 189–194. 
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Krueger, A. B. 1998. “Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the 
Labor Market?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (113:4), pp. 1169–1213. 
Autor, D. H., Levy, F., and Murnane, R. J. 2003. “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An 
Empirical Exploration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (118:4), pp. 1279–1333. 
Bloom, N., Garicano, L., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J. 2014. “The Distinct Effects of Information 
Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization,” Management Science (60:12), 
pp. 2859–2885. 
Bresnahan, T. F., Brynjolfsson, E., and Hitt, L. M. 2002. “Information Technology, Workplace 
Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (117:1), pp. 339–376. 
Brynjolfsson, E., and Hitt, L. 1996. “Paradox Lost? Firm-Level Evidence on the Returns to Information 
Systems Spending,” Management Science (42:4), pp. 541–558. 
Brynjolfsson, E., and Hitt, L. M. 2000. “Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational 
Transformation and Business Performance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (14:4), pp. 23–48. 
Brynjolfsson, E., Malone, T. W., Gurbaxani, V., and Kambil, A. 1994. “Does Information Technology Lead 
to Smaller Firms?,” Management Science (40:12), pp. 1628–1644. 
Brynjolfsson, E., and McAfee, A. 2011. Race Against the Machine, Digital Frontier Press. 
Caroli, E., and Van Reenen, J. 2001. “Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from A Panel of 
British and French Establishments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (116:4), pp. 1449–1492. 
Chwelos, P., Ramirez, R., Kraemer, K. L., and Melville, N. P. 2010. “Does Technological Progress Alter the 
Nature of Information Technology as a Production Input? New Evidence and New Results,” 
Information Systems Research (21:2), pp. 392–408. 
Dewan, S., and Min, C. 1997. “The Substitution of Information Technology for Other Factors of 
Production: A Firm Level Analysis,” Management Science, pp. 1660–1675. 
DiNardo, J. E., and Pischke, J.-S. 1997. “The Returns to Computer Use Revisited: Have Pencils Changed 
the Wage Structure Too?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (112:1), pp. 291–303. 
Drucker, P. F. 1988. “The Coming of The New Organization,” Harvard Business Review (66:1), pp. 45–53. 
Fortin, N. M., and Lemieux, T. 1997. “Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality: Is There a 
Linkage?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (11:2), pp. 75–96. 
Frey, C. B., and Osborne, M. A. 2013. “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to 
Computerisation?,”working paper (available at 
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf). 
Garicano, L. 2000. “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,” Journal of Political 
Economy (108:5), pp. 874–904. 
Garicano, L., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. 2006. “Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (121:4), pp. 1383–1435. 
 The Impact of ICT on Dynamics of Inequality 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 11 
Goldin, C. D., and Katz, L. F. 2008. The Race between Education and Technology, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Gurbaxani, V., and Whang, S. 1991. “The Impact of Information Systems on Organizations and Markets,” 
Communications of the ACM (34:1), pp. 59–73. 
Hitt, L. M. 1999. “Information Technology and Firm Boundaries: Evidence from Panel Data,” Information 
Systems Research (10:2), pp. 134–149. 
Krueger, A. 1993. “How Computers Have Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence from Microdata, 1984–
1989,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (108:1), pp. 33–60. 
Leavitt, H. J., and Whisler, T. L. 1958. “Management in the 1980’s,” Harvard Business Review, pp. 41–48. 
MacCrory, F., Westerman, G., Alhammadi, Y., and Brynjolfsson, E. 2014. “Racing With and Against the 
Machine: Changes in Occupational Skill Composition in an Era of Rapid Technological Advance,” in 
ICIS 2014 Proceedings. 
Machin, S., and Van Reenen, J. 1998. “Technology and Changes in Skill Structure: Evidence from Seven 
OECD Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (113:4), pp. 1215–1244. 
Macmillan, R. H. 1956. Automation, Friend or Foe?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Michaels, G., Natraj, A., and Van Reenen, J. 2014. “Has ICT Polarized Skill Demand?: Evidence from 
Eleven Countries over 25 Years,” Review of Economics and Statistics (96:1), pp. 60–77. 
Ray, G., Wu, D., and Konana, P. 2009. “Competitive Environment and the Relationship between IT and 
Vertical Integration,” Information Systems Research (20:4), pp. 585–603. 
Van Reenen, J. 2011. “Wage Inequality, Technology and Trade: 21st Century Evidence,” Labour 
Economics (18:6), pp. 730–741. 
Rosen, S. 1981. “The Economics of Superstars,” American Economic Review (71:5), pp. 845–858. 
Spender, J. C. 1996. “Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm,” Strategic 
Management Journal (17:S2), pp. 45–62. 
 
